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The current evolution of the space missions demands to increase the computing capacities of the on-board computer while
reducing its power consumption. This requirement evolves faster than the ability of the manufacturers to develop better
space-qualiﬁed processors. To meet the strong requirements, the National Institute of Aerospace Technology has developed a
distributed on-board computer based on commercial oﬀ-the-shelf (COTS). This computer, named OPTOS, provides enhanced
computational capacities with respect to what computers of other small satellites typically provide. To maintain the reliability
needed to perform typical critical activities such as real-time maintenance or current surveillance, authors have conceived a set
of collaborative hardening techniques, taking advantage of the distributed architecture of the OPTOS On-Board Computer. The
3-year mission data analysis shows the feasibility of the collaborative hardening techniques implemented, despite using SEU
sensitive devices. The authors describe the processes and tools used to analyse the data and clearly expose the functional errors
found at unit level, while the system remains unfaulty and reliable thanks to the collaborative techniques.
1. Introduction
In recent years, space missions have experimented an
impressive growth in terms of the number of small satel-
lites designed, manufactured, and launched to orbit
around our planet. Many space agencies, as well as univer-
sities and aerospace companies, have undertaken building
reliable, low-power, and low-cost small satellites to make
aﬀordable scientiﬁc experiments and technology demon-
strations for a wide community of researchers [1]. In [2],
a summary of launched nanosatellites and CubeSats from
1998 is reported; a total amount of 948 nanosats have
been manufactured and launched, being 587 currently
operative in-orbit. On the other hand, 875 CubeSats have
been launched from that date on. The past 10 years have
been the period with the highest number of deliveries of
these spacecrafts, because of the possibility of launching
as an additional payload of a larger mission.
The miniaturization of electronic devices for sensing,
processing, and actuating has helped to produce very eﬀec-
tive and very small minisatellites. There has been an intensive
activity in researching innovative solutions for building these
small satellites with low cost, although maintaining the reli-
ability required in aerospace systems. The ﬁnal system must
behave with the robustness expected from space systems,
while consuming signiﬁcantly less power and costing signiﬁ-
cantly less money. Space-qualiﬁed components are not pro-
viding the degree of ﬂexibility required for these small
systems. The inclusion of commercial components, for non-
critical tasks, is a reality in many space missions, especially in
CubeSats. In [3], a survey on launched CubeSats in the past
12 years highlights the improvement margin in control
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(On-Board Computer (OBC)) and communications, which
allow accomplishing larger missions for space exploration,
and not only for Low Earth Orbits (LEO). In this study,
and in NASA reports [4], the use of commercial devices is
not forbidden, although test is highly recommended.
Following this tendency, the National Institute of Aero-
space Technique (INTA) proposed, designed, and developed
in 2013 a 3U-CubeSat satellite named OPTOS [5, 6] that fea-
tures low size, low cost, low-power consumption, low weight,
and high-performance capabilities. The satellite was partially
built with commercial components, previously assessed w.r.t.
their fault tolerance. OPTOS was conceived with no data
wires (wireless optical data bus communication). Optical
Wireless Links to intra-Spacecraft communications (OWLS)
technology [7, 8] is based on diﬀuse light emitted by LED
through open space within the satellite, which is received
by discrete photodiodes and processed by programmable
logic devices (PLD). This wireless approach facilitates the
implementations of new collaborative hardening techniques,
where all messages sent by any unit are received by all units at
the same time (mesh-like topologies). Furthermore, the sys-
tem was designed as a network of distributed terminals, in
charge of diﬀerent payloads, but sharing critical and global
tasks. Collaborative hardening techniques were applied to
minimize the eﬀects of transient faults in the architecture [9].
The design and development of this CubeSat have been
already reported in scientiﬁc publications and technical
reports. In this paper, the authors present the assessment of
the OPTOS collaborative hardening computer during its
3-year operation in a LEO orbit.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related
work about the design of reliable on-board computers is
detailed. Section 3 states the procedure followed to analyse
the radiation environment and apply this knowledge to
OPTOS OBC (On-Board Computer). Section 4 describes
the on-board computer architecture. In-orbit data analysis
is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 states the conclu-
sions of this work.
2. Related Work
The hardening techniques applied to processor architec-
tures have been addressed either through software-based
or hardware-based approaches or through both of them
[10]. One of the most reliable and widely used approach
consists in triplicating the core processor based in a COTS
ﬁeld-programmable gate array (FPGA), with an external
radiation-hardened (Rad-Hard) component performing
majority voting and reconﬁguration tasks. This technique is
commonly known as scrubbing [11, 12]. The technique con-
sists in reading the conﬁguration memory of the FPGA and
comparing it with the initial value, which is stored in a
Rad-Hard nonvolatile memory.Whenever a bit-ﬂip is detected,
the external component (so called, scrubber) reconﬁgures the
FPGA with correct values. All this process is made on-the-ﬂy,
without interrupting operation. This technique allows a reliable
use of SRAM-based FPGAs, increasing the performance over
traditional space computers. The main drawbacks of these
solutions appear in terms of a signiﬁcant increase in power
consumption and larger development time introduced by the
complexity of the redundancy and the scrubbing process.
An alternative mechanism is applying redundancy at the
device level or even making redundant the whole system
board. This approach is called hot redundancy, where all
the redundant units synchronously process data, and an
external hardware is in-charge of identifying faulty units.
Example of this architecture are ESA’s Data Management
System (DMS-R) or EADS’s SPAICE computer. Obviously,
these approaches are reserved only for high-demanding and
rich-resourced platforms, such as the International Space
Station or telecom satellites.
Some common software hardening techniques are refer-
enced as Software-Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance
(SIHFT). These techniques are usually focused on correcting
either computational, control ﬂow, or memory errors [13].
SIHFT techniques are low-cost and much easier to imple-
ment than their hardware counterparts. A well-known disad-
vantage of software hardening is the overhead that it is being
added both in terms of execution time and in terms of mem-
ory usage. However, some new methodologies, as presented
in [14], have shown to improve execution time overhead
while, at the same time, increasing the reliability of the sys-
tem against Single Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) errors.
Nevertheless, software techniques are only a partial solution,
since Single Event Latch-up (SEL) and Total Ionizing Dose
(TID) eﬀects on microelectronics may only be dealt by hard-
ware approaches.
3. Computer Radiation Assurance
As part of the radiation engineering activities of OPTOS mis-
sion, a full radiation tolerance analysis was carried out. This
analysis included the characterization of the expected
high-energy particle ﬂuxes during the mission and a detailed
simulation study on the propagation of such ﬂuxes through a
full 3D model of the platform (with the FASTRAD [15] tool),
which considered the main shielding structures and subsys-
tems. The ﬁnal aim was to provide a realistic estimation of
the radiation levels intraspacecraft in the form of particle
spectral ﬂuxes and cumulated ionizing and nonionizing
doses at selected locations and components.
These estimated radiation levelswereused for the selection
of technologies according to their radiation tolerances and
provided the input environment for the evaluation of the
End-of-Life (EOL) degradation of radiation-sensitive ele-
ments. Moreover, the outputs of the study were used for the
estimation of the Single Event Eﬀects (SEE) average rates for
speciﬁc components. In particular, the rates for Single Event
Upsets (SEU) in diﬀerent memory regions and for device
functional interruptions (SEFI) were estimated for Xilinx
CoolRunner-II and Virtex-II programmable logic devices.
In the following subsections, we detail the calculation
techniques and models used for the radiation environment
propagation, as well as the experimental irradiation test data
used for the SEE rates prediction.
3.1. OPTOS Radiation Environment. Launched in Novem-
ber 23rd, 2013, to a sun-synchronous orbit with an average
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altitude of 670 km, the OPTOS mission was exposed to a
severe radiation environment, consisting essentially of a
dominating ﬂux of high-energy protons and electrons,
coming from the Van Allen’s inner radiation belt, occa-
sionally perturbed in case of solar particle events and the
constant background ﬂux of high-Z species due to the
galactic cosmic ray (GCR) contribution.
For the estimation of the Van Allen’s belt particle ﬂuxes,
the environment model used was the AP8/AE8 [16–18],
which was recommended by the European Space Agency
(ESA) in their ECSS guidelines [19, 20] as the standard model
for near-Earth missions. In the case of solar events and
GCRs, following ESA recommendations, the environmen-
tal models applied were, respectively, the ESP/PHYSCIC
[21–23], with a 95% conﬁdence level, and the ISO-15390
[24], including the Earth magnetosphere cut-oﬀ.
3.2. OPTOS Radiation 3D Model. To propagate the mission
environment from the previous section down to speciﬁc
locations inside the OPTOS platform, a 3D mass model
of the main spacecraft structural elements was built by
means of FASTRAD tool and the actual OPTOS mechan-
ical CAD designs. In addition, simpliﬁed models of the
CoolRunner-II and the Virtex-II ICs were implemented,
simulating both devices as plastic-packaged components,
with the actual IC dimensions, and encapsulating them
inside a thin silicon layer (100μm thick). Figure 1 shows
the OPTOS 3D model as built with the FASTRAD tool.
The ﬁnal OPTOS 3D model achieved a total simulated
mass of 2.5 kg. Once the 3Dmodel was geometrically veriﬁed,
it was exported as a ﬁle in GDML format [25] to be used as an
input for the particle propagation Code, GEANT4 [26, 27], a
Monte-Carlo toolkit developed at the European Organiza-
tion for Nuclear Research (CERN), capable of simulating
the passage and interaction of high-energy radiation in mat-
ter using realistic electromagnetic and hadronic models [28].
The physics packages included for the simulation of
OPTOS environment were the standard model, option-4,
for the electromagnetic interactions, and the QGSP-BIC
package for the hadronic processes. The average annual pro-
ton spectral ﬂux obtained for locations inside the OPTOS
platform is shown in Figure 2.
3.3. Experimental Irradiation Test. In 2007, during the feasi-
bility phases of the OPTOS program, a series of irradiation
test campaigns were conducted [29] with the aim of charac-
terizing the SEE sensibility of the CoolRunner-II devices to
high-energy proton particles. Six CPLDs were tested (DUT
1 to DUT 6), four of them (DUT 1, DUT 7, DUT 2, and
DUT 3) were in static mode to study SEU susceptibility,
DUT 1 and DUT 7 irradiated while powered on to test SRAM
memory, and ﬁnally DUT 2 and DUT 3 also powered on and
oﬀ, respectively, to test ﬂash conﬁguration memory in diﬀer-
ent conditions. All devices were tested under a monoener-
getic single proton energy, from 10.75 to 62.91MeV, and
up to maximum ﬂuence of 1010 proton/cm2 or 100 SEE
events, whichever condition achieved ﬁrst.
Testing results, in the form of SEE cross-section versus
proton incident energy, were obtained for each DUT and
ﬁtted to a Weibull distribution function. Table 1 shows the
Weibull ﬁtting parameters for the diﬀerent DUTs and SEE.
For the Virtex-II devices [30], Tables 2 and 3 show the
irradiation testing results for SEU and SEFI from the manu-
facturer in the form of Weibull ﬁtting parameters for heavy
ions and protons.
3.4. Estimated SEE Error Rates. Finally, combining the par-
ticle models from Section 3.1, the attenuated proton spec-
trum from Section 3.2 and the experimental SEE data
from 3.3, an estimation of the SEE occurrence rates for
the OPTOS mission was performed. Table 4 shows the
SEU (DUT 1 and 7) and SEFI (DUT 4 and 5) predicted
Figure 1: OPTOS 3D radiation model as built with FASTRAD tool.
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Figure 2: OPTOS 3D radiation model as built with FASTRAD tool.
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rates for the CoolRunner-II CPLD used in OPTOS OBC,
Low Earth Orbit. The same analysis was performed for
Virtex-II devices (see Table 5).
After performing all these calculi, the MTBF of the
CoolRunner-II CPLD are around 20.83 days while in contin-
uous operation without any reconﬁguration cycle. Virtex-II
(XC2V256) is the device used for DOT 7 (Distributed OBC
Terminal). This device was selected instead of CR-II because
DOT 7 controls a complex payload called APIS [31] and
needed extra resources to deal with it. Virtex-II XC2V256
FPGA has 1,593,632 conﬁguration bits, and therefore the
SEU rate shall be of 0.07 SEU/Device/Day. Therefore, the
MTBF of DOT 7 will be very similar to the other DOTs
(1 through 6). As shown in Table 6, SEFI are negligible
for the OPTOS mission.
4. On-Board Computer
The proposed architecture is based on a distributed processor
where all terminals are connected by an Optical Wireless
CAN Bus [7]. Each unit can achieve redundantly all critical
duties that belong to the OBC, and separately they will give
speciﬁc services to Sub-Systems (S/S) or Pay-Loads (P/L)
connected to them. Typical critical duties of an OBC are
real-time maintenance, self-check supervision, and P/L
latch-up control. Additionally, parallel processing may also
be achieved if necessary. The purpose of this architecture is
to maximize the processing capabilities and developing
collaborative hardening techniques to increase the reliabil-
ity of the OBC.
This design considers two kinds of units.
(i) Enhanced Processing Hardware (EPH). This unit is
based on Xilinx Virtex-II (XC2V1000) FPGA com-
manded by MicroBlaze soft processor. The aim of
this unit is to support the On-Board Software
(OBSW) that will process communications through
TTC S/S and support ADCS software. These two
S/S aim for a complex processing capability that
may not be achieved by DOT units
(ii) Distributed OBC Terminals (DOT). These units are
based on ultralow power Xilinx CoolRunner-II
(XC2C512) CPLD. They are oriented to control all
the other satellite S/S (PDU, ADCS, etc.) and P/L.
Table 1: CoolRunner-II proton irradiation results. Weibull ﬁtting
parameters.
DUT W S ETh (MeV)
Saturation cross
section (cm-2 device-1)
1 (SEU-SRAM) 5.4 0.58 10.8 2.13·10-8
4 (SEFI) 4.0 0.46 10.8 5.70·10-9
5 (SEFI) 4.1 0.53 10.8 6.61·10-9
7 (SEU-SRAM) 5.6 0.65 10.8 2.35·10-8
Table 2: Virtex-II irradiation SEU results. Weibull ﬁtting
parameters.
Cell W S ETh (MeV)
Saturation cross
section (cm-2 bit-1)
Protons
Conﬁg-Bits 12 0.5 3.0 3.8·10-14
BRAM 12 0.6 3.0 4.1·10-14
Heavy ions
Conﬁg-Bits 33 0.8 1.0 4.37·10-8
BRAM 17 0.9 1.0 4.19·10-8
Table 3: Virtex-II irradiation SEFI results. Weibull ﬁtting
parameters.
Cell W S ETh (MeV)
Saturation cross
section (cm-2 device-1)
Protons
POR011 12 1.0 7.0 3.74·10-13
SMAP2 12 0.5 6.5 5.72·10-13
JCFG3 12 0.5 6.0 2.86·10-13
Heavy ions
POR1 22 1.2 1.5 2.50·10-6
SMAP2 17 1.0 1.5 1.72·10-6
JCFG3 17 1.0 1.5 2.51·10-7
1Power-on reset; 2select MAP conﬁguration port; 3JTAG conﬁguration port.
Table 4: SEU and SEFI rates for CoolRunner-II.
Device/cell
Proton Ions Total
(device-1 year-1)
SEU-SRAM (DUT 1) 20 ± 4 — 20 ± 4
SEU-SRAM (DUT 7) 21 ± 4 — 21 ± 4
SEFI (DUT 4) 5 ± 1 — 5 ± 1
SEFI (DUT 5) 6 ± 1 — 6 ± 1
Table 5: SEU rates for Virtex-II.
Device/cell
Proton Ions Total
(bit-1 day-1)
Conﬁg-Bits 1.4·10-7 7.6·10-8 2.2·10-7
BRAM 1.6·10-7 9.3·10-8 2.5·10-7
Table 6: SEFI rates for Virtex-II for OPTOS radiation environment.
Device/cell
Proton Ions Total
(device-1 day-1)
POR1 1.4·10−6 4.4·10-6 5.8·10-6
SMAP2 2.1·10−6 5.2·10-6 7.3·10-6
JCFG3 1.0·10−6 5.0·10-7 1.5·10-6
4 International Journal of Aerospace Engineering
They will be all interconnected (including EPH)
through an optical wireless CAN Bus, and they will
give support in terms of intelligent control logic
through the following interfaces to the S/S and P/L
connected to them.
(a) Four ten-bit ADC inputs with a dynamic range of
0 to 3.0V
(b) Sixteen digital inputs/outputs
Figure 3 shows the top-level architecture of OPTOS col-
laborative computer.
On-Board Communications Subsystem (Ob-Com) is
based on a set of miniaturized transceivers capable of imple-
menting an optical wireless network inside the satellite [7].
This network is made available through a CAN BUS imple-
mentation, conferring the OBC instant and complete com-
munication between all its DOTs. Ob-Com is based on
OWLS technology [8], which transmit data with diﬀuse light
(emitted by LED) through the open spaces in the satellite.
Data is received by discrete photodiodes with real-time pro-
cessing made by a built-in PLD.
4.1. Collaborative Hardening. This section describes the pro-
posed hardened computer architecture of OPTOS satellite,
thanks to collaborative hardening, with special remarks in
the implementation of the critical tasks. This innovative
hardening technique must be considered as a design para-
digm. It has been developed to create a complete solution
for small mass, low power, low price, resource-rich, and reli-
able picosatellites processing architectures.
On-Board Real Time maintenance is a critical task in
every satellite system [32]. This task is usually undertaken
either by a Rad-Hard component which keeps track of
Real Time or by a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) receiver [33–35]. Both options are expensive in
terms of power consumption and cost. Yet another beneﬁt
of the proposed collaborative system is to be able to main-
tain On-Board Real Time without the use of the
above-mentioned options.
In the development of OPTOS OBC, the challenge was
twofold. First, a reliable and dependable system should be
built using devices that are not inherently robust: commercial
CPLDs with SEU sensitivity in their SRAM memory ele-
ments. Secondly, critical tasks to be run on the satellite can
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Figure 3: OPTOS On-Board Computer Top-Level Architecture. (OPTOS S/S: EPS (Electronic Power Subsystem); ADCS (Attitude
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be replicated along the nodes in the network to perform
an intrinsically redundant task execution. One of these
critical tasks is the real-time maintenance, which has been
designed in a distributed way within the network previ-
ously described, avoiding a single point of failure thanks
to collaborative hardening.
Collaborative hardening is based on the parallel capabil-
ities of the PLD. Each DOT uses its free resources to execute,
in parallel with its own dedicated duties, speciﬁc algorithms
to maintain OBC critical tasks in collaboration with all the
other DOTs in the system. As an example of this, the satellite
Real Time is maintained through the Real-Time Mainte-
nance process (RTM). Real Time is updated from Earth
through the TTC subsystem at every Earth contact to avoid
time shifting due to each DOT oscillator errors. Once the
Real Time has been introduced in the OBC, every DOT
maintains its Own Real Time (ORT). Every second, the
RTM process begins for all DOT maintaining its Own Real
Time (ORT). These DOT can broadcast two types of mes-
sages. First, their ORT is broadcast to the network’s elements.
Secondly, a voting message is broadcast by a DOT when its
ORT is not equal to received Real Time from other DOT.
Once the complete voting process has ﬁnished, those DOT
that detect a failure in its ORT execute a reset process to clean
its conﬁguration memory from possible errors caused by
SEUs. Meanwhile, the collaborative hardening achieves in
protecting Real-Time maintenance, as the nonfailure DOT,
success through the RTM process to keep the satellite Real
Time updated. As explained hereafter, in Section 5.3, no Real
Time loss has been detected across the whole mission.
5. In-Orbit Data Analysis
This section is composed of three subsections. First subsec-
tion describes how the collaborative computer generates
data, which type of data, and under what circumstances.
The second subsection describes the tools implemented to
analyse the gathered data. Finally, in the third subsection
the results of the analysis are presented.
5.1. Telemetry. To analyse the behaviour of the
fault-tolerant collaborative computer on board a satellite,
there are several considerations and diﬃculties to have
into account. Probably the most important one is the
observability of the system. The system we pretend to
analyse is the one that will be generating the data to be
studied, and therefore performing any processing of the
data to be studied should avoided. This means that
RAW data must be sent to Earth, limiting the amount
of data to be gathered. This limitation is also increased
by the following factors:
(i) OBC must share bandwidth with other 7 subsystems
and 4 payloads
(ii) Downlink speed is 5Kbps with only 3 to 4 con-
tacts with the Earth Ground Station, with a typi-
cal total contact time of 20 minutes per day
(including the uplink of Telecommands to the
satellite).
With these considerations in mind, we decided to pro-
duce telemetries (i.e., pieces of data suitable to be stored in
the On-Board Memory for further download to Earth) stor-
ing only the CAN messages generated by the OBC, concern-
ing the collaborative hardening. This approach has allowed
to maximize the amount of useful data retrieved to validate
the OBC collaborative activities.
5.2. Analysis Tool. The analysis tool designed and developed
to study the behaviour of OPTOS OBC has been divided into
two well-diﬀerentiated modules. The ﬁrst module, called TM
Decoder, is meant to extract the useful information from the
Telemetry Data Packages that are transferred from OPTOS
to Earth. This tool extracts the CAN messages, propagates
the timestamp of each message, and stores them into a struc-
ture that is easy to manage by the second module.
The second module is called OBC Simulator. This mod-
ule is a model-driven software where each DOT has been
modelized with a set of parametric values. Each of these
models can produce a deterministic response not only in
form but also in time. The models are fed with only two
inputs as follows:
(i) Clock. This the tick of each model that simulates the
real oscillator mounted on each DOT. Clock allows
minimal diﬀerences for each DOT, as each oscillator
has small diﬀerences (QT25L9M part from Q-TECH
was used. This oscillator presents a frequency stabil-
ity of 50 ppm.), allowing simulation of more realistic
scenarios and more random at the same time
(ii) CAN Messages. Messages generated by the other
units that constitute the OBC
Finally, the analysis tool connects the TM Decoder mod-
ule with the OBC Simulator module, feeding it with the
extracted messages of the telemetry. The analysis tool com-
pares the output of each DOT model with the messages gen-
erated on-board at the OPTOS satellite. Whenever a message
is out of the simulated behaviour of the model, it is marked to
be considered erroneous. An erroneous message is deﬁned by
a misbehaviour of the DOT due to a SEU or the accumulation
of multiple SEU.
To validate the analysis tool (among other functionalities
of the satellite), a functional Mission Simulation Test (MST)
was carried out during the Assembly, Integration and Veriﬁ-
cation phase of OPTOS CubeSat. During this test campaign,
Table 7: Total number of messages vs. erroneous ones.
Unit Total messages Num. of errors Error rate
DOT 1 23991418 76 3,1678E-06
DOT 2 19629342 61 3,10759E-06
DOT 3 10905190 22 2,02546E-06
DOT 4 8724152 18 2,06324E-06
DOT 5 9734432 45 4,62277E-06
DOT 6 14176747 28 1,97507E-06
DOT 7 15277844 30 1,96363E-06
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most of the parameters aﬀecting the operation of the satellite
were simulated.
(i) Sun and eclipse periods were simulated as if a real
orbit was developed around Earth
(ii) Earth contacts were limited to a real scenario
(iii) Communications were only achieved through RF
Telemetry and Telecommand subsystem
MST was carried out for 21 days. The OBC telemetries
gathered were then introduced in the analysis tool. Only 8
CAN messages among more than 30,000 messages were
marked as erroneous by the OBC Simulator. After analysing
those messages, all of them resulted to be because of a misun-
derstanding of the programmed behaviour of the EPH unit.
The error in the model was corrected. This test was helpful
not only for validating the tool but also to gain more conﬁ-
dence in the collaborative hardening techniques imple-
mented in the OBC.
5.3. In-Orbit Results. At End-of-Life, OPTOS ground seg-
ment had received a total of 102,439,125 CAN messages
coming from OBC collaborative hardening tasks. From the
0%
10%
20%
30%
DOT1 DOT2 DOT3 DOT4 DOT5 DOT6 DOT7
Unitary errors (%)
Total messages (%)
Unit DOT 1 DOT 2 DOT 3 DOT 4 DOT 5 DOT 6 DOT 7
Unitary errors (%) 27% 22% 8% 6% 16% 10% 11%
Total messages (%) 23% 19% 11% 9% 10 14% 15%
Figure 4: Total messages sent by unit and its committed errors.
Figure 5: Housekeeping analysis of DOT 5 current deterioration values.
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whole set of messages, only 280 messages have been catego-
rized as erroneous messages. Table 7 shows the numbers cat-
egorized by DOT.
The relationship between the number of errors and the
number of messages is very consistent in DOT 3, 4, 6, and
7. For DOT 1 and 2, the number of errors is increased
compared with the other DOT. The reason why this has
happened is because DOT 1 and 2 also have the highest
CAN ID priority among all units. This means that during
the arbitrary negotiation of the CAN protocol, when two
or more units try to send a message at the same bit time,
access to the bus will be obtained by those high priority
units (i.e., DOT 1 and DOT 2). As explained before, the
Real-Time Maintenance algorithm starts with every unit
trying to send a Broadcast Message with its own real time.
As most of the Broadcast Messages are sent by these units,
they send more messages than the others and cause more
erroneous messages.
Figure 4 illustrates very well this situation and the rela-
tionship between the number of messages sent and the num-
ber of errors detected.
Nevertheless, the Real-Time Maintenance algorithm
does not explain why DOT 5 has also such a great num-
ber of errors compared with the others DOT. To ﬁnd a
possible explanation to this issue, we have studied the sat-
ellite housekeeping information, searching for any signiﬁ-
cant change in the measured parameters of DOT 5. In
fact, only three months after OPTOS was injected in its
orbit, an unexplained issue began to happen with DOT
5’s current housekeeping. Each DOT has a characteristic
current draw depending on the connected PL/SS and func-
tionality. Actually, DOT 5 nominal current was 23mA.
But on February 2014, current started to diminish until
14mA. During satellite commissioning, we were not able
to see any unusual behaviour of DOT 5; however, the
thorough analysis carried out during the last months and
explained in this paper shows that deterioration in the
unit provoked extra errors along the whole mission in this
DOT (see Figure 5).
CAN messages marked as erroneous have been catego-
rized according to the nature of the problem that caused
them. Five diﬀerent groups have been deﬁned as follows:
(a) DOT Timing Error. This error is signalled, whenever
a wrong broadcast time or voting message has been
sent by one DOT
(b) DOT Management Error. This error is signalled,
whenever a DOT sends a message out of order or in
an inadequate time slot. The timing and order of
the messages to be sent is controlled by an internal
VHDL module called DOT management
(c) DOT Communications Error. This error comprises
those components in charge of the communications
through CAN BUS protocol
(d) DOT Failure Error. Any other error encountered by
the analysis tool not categorized in the previous error
will be signalled as DOT Failure
(e) System Error. This error comprises not only a single
failure in one DOT but also a situation of loss of Real
Time in the satellite. System Error means that the
collaborative hardening techniques developed by
OPTOS OBC have failed
Across the whole analysis performed with all the gathered
telemetry during almost 3-year mission of OPTOS OBC, no
System Error (i.e., loss of the real time due to an error in
the collaborative hardening techniques) has been found. This
analysis conﬁrms the reliability of the system is higher than
the sum of the reliability of its components. OPTOS OBC
has successfully applied collaborative hardening techniques
to maximize the reliability while reducing cost, mass, and
power with an OBC made with non-radiation-tolerant
COTS. Of course, this could never be achieved if the used
parts were very susceptible to Single Event Latch-ups or Total
Ionizing Dose.
Regarding the unitary errors found through the analysis,
the real distribution is shown in Figure 6.
As clearly seen in the graph, the TIME Errors are the
most predominant of all, not only in DOT 1 and 2 as we
have already stated but also less predominantly in the rest
of the units. This is explained by two complementary rea-
sons as follows:
(a) Timing module uses a great number of Flip-Flops
inside each CPLD, and SEUs hitting those registers
are easily propagated into errors. This is exactly the
opposite case of the Communication Module, which
is being cleared at each clock cycle with new values
coming from outside the CPLD
(b) At the same time, whenever a DOT unit starts to send
any time-relatedmessage (either broadcast or voting),
if a SEU provokes and error on the communication
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Time
Management
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COMMS Time Management Failure
DOT 1 5.0 47.0 19.0 5.0
DOT 2 3.0 41.0 13.0 4.0
DOT 3 2.0 11.0 6.0 3.0
DOT 4 1.0 9.0 7.0 1.0
DOT 5 10.0 17.0 14.0 4.0
DOT 6 3.0 14.0 10.0 1.0
DOT 7 2.0 15.0 9.0 4.0
Figure 6: Distribution of type of errors per DOT.
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module, the analysis tool understands the error as
coming from the timing module. There is no way to
diﬀerentiate between those errors in such situation,
and therefore, some Communication Errors might
have been understood as Time errors
To conclude with the analysis, we decided to include the
latitude and longitude position to each of the messages
resulted as errors. Due to the previous analysis of the cross
section of both devices, the passes of the satellite through
the South Atlantic Anomaly and by the poles (especially if
coincides with a Solar Flare) should be the most favourable
to see errors. We created a tool to propagate the satellite
position from a TLE ﬁle provided by NORAD. Then, we
introduced the result in a Google Fusion Table to be able to
see the data into a Map ﬁle. As expected, SAA was the main
driver of the SEUs aﬀecting OPTOS OBC.
To analyse if we could ﬁnd any further information with
the map images, we decided to include two distributions. In
the ﬁrst image (Figure 7), each dot colour represents a diﬀer-
ent unit (DOT 1, 2, etc.). Figure 8 has been categorized by
error type.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerences have been found neither by
DOT nor by type of error. The distribution of errors along
the SAA and the poles is exactly the predicted behaviour
for a satellite on a LEO orbit.
Figure 7: World map error distribution by DOT type.
Figure 8: World map error distribution by error type.
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6. Conclusions
The use of commercial electronic devices in aerospace
applications is still considered as a risky decision. How-
ever, space agencies, academia, and aerospace companies
are using them on-board spacecrafts for noncritical tasks.
This work presents a real case of a satellite, OPTOS Cube-
Sat, designed, manufactured, launched, and ﬂight during a
3-year mission that merge the new winds of ﬂexibility,
smart fault tolerance techniques, and cost consciousness
to prove it is possible to produce reliable and eﬀective
architectures for small satellites.
In this paper, the hardening by-design techniques
applied to the collaborative OBC of the OPTOS satellite
are presented. Due to the use of COTS, a comprehensive
radiation assurance analysis has been carried out based
on the test performed by INTA to CR-II during the
early phases of the project, as well as to Virtex-II FPGA
based on the analysis carried out by the Xilinx Radiation
Test Consortium.
Moreover, the authors have produced a set of models and
simulators to thoroughly analyse the in-orbit behaviour of
the On-Board Computer. These tools have been previously
validated with real data and have returned a valuable set of
processed data.
Collaborative hardening techniques have proven to be
reliable to support the critical task of a small satellite and
yet allow the use of much more eﬃcient components in terms
of power consumption, processing capabilities, and cost.
Data analysis presented in “In-Orbit Results” section proved
that collaborative architecture succeeded in preventing single
unit errors to propagate to the system, allowing the mainte-
nance of the critical tasks unfaulty during the whole 3-year
mission of OPTOS.
Future small satellites may take advantage of the pre-
sented architecture to reduce cost, size, and power consump-
tion while keeping safe the critical tasks of the satellite.
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